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Abstract 
 
The (sometimes fragile) balance between South Africa's constitutional 
obligations to protect and promote human rights in the international arena 
and the realities of political practice is the focus of this paper. The 
Constitution provides for solid dualist mechanisms and procedures for 
parliamentary oversight of the executive's conduct in the governance of 
international relations, including the conclusion of treaties. There is, 
however, a congenital constitutional flaw in the oversight instrumentation of 
the Constitution: the president is endowed with practically unfettered 
control over cabinet, and through the cabinet and the parliamentary caucus, 
he has indirect but firm control over parliament. Consequently, 
parliamentary oversight of international relations is severely challenged, 
effectively leaving it to the minority parties, civil society and the courts. 
This paper assesses the effectiveness of the protection of international 
human rights in South Africa by constitutional means. It begins by setting 
out the constitutional foundations that were designed to provide the desired 
protection and the place of international law in the South African legal order. 
This is followed by a description of the impact of political reality on the 
implementation of the constitutional oversight mechanisms. 
Due to the justiciability of government conduct under the Constitution, 
parliamentary oversight of executive conduct in the international sphere 
has largely taken the form of judicial review. In this, the courts have 
performed very well. This emerges from a concise overview of some key 
cases in which the courts developed sound principles and delivered strong 
judgments about the government's failures to maintain the required 
constitutional standards in its international relations. The cases show a 
sensitivity on the part of the courts to avoid judicial overreach, while taking 
up the responsibility to uphold constitutionalism. 
While the courts' stabilising interventions must be applauded, the executive 
tendency to flout its constitutional responsibilities remains a cause for 
concern. 
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1 Introduction1 
In constitutional terms the South African Parliament has final control over 
the ratification of international treaties and the country's withdrawal 
therefrom. However, in reality, parliamentary conduct is firmly under the, 
albeit indirect, control of the executive. South African constitutional 
democracy is founded upon a sound Constitution, but in political practice 
over the past decades South African governments and organs of state have 
sorely tested the constitutional limitations on executive discretion and wilful 
disregard for the precepts of constitutionalism.2 Furthermore, a glaring 
dissonance has developed between the constitutional ideals and 
governmental practice insofar as parliamentary oversight of the ratification 
of and withdrawal from treaties is concerned. 
This analysis begins with an outline of the constitutional foundations that 
were designed to protect international human rights and the place of 
international law therein in the context of what has been referred to as 
"double-facing" constitutionalism. The next section describes the impact of 
majoritarian politics under extra-parliamentary direction on constitutionalism 
and its effects on the management of the country's international relations. 
Section 4 below offers a concise overview of key judgments of the courts in 
which the judiciary has developed sound principles and delivered strong 
judgments following governmental failures to maintain the required 
constitutional standards in dealing with the country's international relations. 
In the final section some conclusions are drawn regarding the courts' search 
for and articulation of the appropriate balance between judicial deference 
and their constitutional responsibilities. 
2 Human rights foundations of the Constitution and the 
place of international law 
Constitutions are aspirational documents, and international law is a crucial 
component of the 21st Century ambition to order the world peacefully. Public 
international law, however, is notoriously malleable and difficult to enforce. 
The texts of the two South African constitutions adopted in the last decade 
                                            
*   Francois Venter. B Jur et Comm LLD (PU for CHE). Extraordinary Professor, North-
West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa. E-mail: Francois.Venter@nwu.ac.za. 
1  This paper was prepared for and presented at a workshop organised by the SARChI 
Professorship in International Constitutional Law, Faculty of Law, University of 
Pretoria, the Faculty of Law, University of Namibia and the Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung (Kenya Office) in Windhoek, Namibia on 6-8 March 2019. 
2  See section 3 below for details. 
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of the 20th Century3 resonated well with the liberal ideals of the communis 
opinio underpinning international law. 
A "Constitutional Assembly" consisting of both Houses of the 1994 
Parliament was mandated and constrained to adopt a new constitution 
which would comply with a set of binding "Constitutional Principles", the 
second one of which began as follows: 
Everyone shall enjoy all universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms 
and civil liberties, which shall be provided for and protected by entrenched and 
justiciable provisions in the Constitution … 
Section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution, essentially reproduced in section 
39(1) of the 1996 Constitution, required judicial interpretation of 
fundamental rights in a manner that promotes the values that underlie an 
open and democratic society, while having regard to (that is, while being 
compelled to consider) applicable international law. Beginning with its 
section 1 the Constitution identifies a range of founding values of the South 
African state, the core of which is reflected in the triad human dignity, 
equality and freedom. Significantly, section 7(1) of the Constitution, the first 
of the Bill of Rights, provides as follows: 
This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines 
the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of 
human dignity, equality and freedom. 
The last chapter of the Constitution4 opens with three sections under the 
sub-heading "International Law".5 These provisions have the effect of 
constitutionalising key elements of South African law relating to international 
law, which has proven to be significant from various perspectives for the 
interpretation and application of the Bill of Rights especially. Beyond 
fundamental rights, section 233 instructs courts to― 
                                            
3  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 (hereinafter referred to as 
"the 1993 Constitution"), which introduced constitutionalism to South Africa when it 
came into effect on 27 April 1994 and provided the foundations and most of the 
notional principles of the current Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution"). The 1993 Constitution, often referred 
to (inaccurately because it was a comprehensive constitution) as the "interim 
constitution", was conceived as a transitional constitution which prescribed the 
process for the adoption and content of a "final" or permanent constitution, which the 
Constitution became on 4 February 1997. 
4  Chapter 14 under the heading "General Provisions". 
5  These provisions were preceded by and were modelled upon ss 231 of the 1993 
Constitution. 
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… prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with 
international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with 
international law. 
An essential characteristic of the Constitution (as provided for in section 2) 
is its supremacy, which renders invalid all other law and conduct which is 
inconsistent with it. Furthermore, although the pre-constitutional common 
law position regarding customary international law was incorporated in 
South African law in terms of section 232 of the Constitution, not only the 
supremacy of the Constitution but also the primary legislative authority of 
Parliament over customary international law was entrenched. This was 
achieved with the qualification "unless it [customary international law] is 
inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament" included in the 
same provision, section 232. 
The origin of South African common law relating to international relations is, 
for obvious historical reasons, the English Common Law. The continued 
authority of Common Law thinking in the South African legal order has 
naturally been affected by the introduction of a supreme constitution. 
Nevertheless, subject to the acknowledgement of the prevalence of 
constitutional norms, guidance may still be taken from English sources 
concerning notions such as dualism derived from the Common Law. Such 
an excellent source is to be found in the recent article by a scholar from New 
Zealand, Professor Campbell McLachlan, who exhaustively analysed and 
contextualised four judgments of the UK Supreme Court delivered in 
January 2017, focussing on the question of the extent of the jurisdiction of 
municipal courts to regulate the external exercise of executive power.6 
Although constitutional supremacy (and the demise of the royal prerogative) 
has the effect that if McLachlan's question were applied to South Africa it 
would not necessarily produce precisely the same outcome, it is informative 
for the present purposes to take note of his application of the expression, a 
"double-facing" constitution. He uses the concept to express the notion that 
a constitution determines both "internal relations within a state" and "the 
manner in which the organs of the state engage outside its borders".7 He 
identifies "two fundamental principles of legality", being firstly that the 
executive is not above the law, and that the executive has no power to alter 
the law.8 He points out, with reference to English precedent, that "the 
rationale for the dualist theory [is] a form of protection of the citizen from 
                                            
6  McLachlan 2018 LQR. 
7  McLachlan 2018 LQR 380. 
8  McLachlan 2018 LQR 380. 
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abuses by the executive",9 and that the fact that Parliament (not the 
executive) has the power to determine the law has two fundamental 
outcomes: 
In the first place, it protects ordinary people against the arbitrary exercise of 
executive power – a basic function of the rule of law. Secondly, it ensures that 
only democratically-elected representatives in Parliament can change the law 
– a basic tenet of representative democracy.10 
The review in section 4 below of South African jurisprudence on this point 
shows that the motivation of the South African judiciary in its adjudication of 
matters relating to legislative and executive conduct regarding foreign 
relations is similar to the rationale behind English precedent, as discussed 
by McLachlan. 
Regarding treaties ("international agreements" in the constitutional text), an 
expressly dualistic approach has been ensconced in section 231 of the 
Constitution: entering into treaties is a function reserved for the government, 
but to be internationally binding on the Republic they require parliamentary 
approval. To become binding municipal law, a treaty needs to be 
incorporated by means of parliamentary legislation.11 Creating an area of 
interpretational opaqueness, section 231(3) provides that treaties "of a 
technical, administrative or executive nature, or an agreement which does 
not require either ratification or accession, entered into by the national 
executive" do not require parliamentary approval to be binding, and in terms 
of sub-section (4) "self-executing" provisions of treaties become law with 
the approval of Parliament without requiring incorporation by means of 
legislation. 
In addition to its core function as the national legislator, the National 
Assembly is required by section 55(2) of the Constitution to establish 
mechanisms "to ensure that all executive organs of state in the national 
sphere of government are accountable to it" and "to maintain oversight of 
the exercise of national executive authority", obviously including the 
maintenance of international relations. 
                                            
9  McLachlan 2018 LQR 381. 
10  McLachlan 2018 LQR 394. 
11  Where a parliamentary Act provided that the national executive may enter into an 
agreement with the government of any other country whereby arrangements are 
made to avoid double taxation, it was determined in Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service v Van Kets 2012 3 SA 399 (WCC) that provisions of such an 
agreement ranked at least equal with domestic law, including the provisions of 
the Act. 
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Over the past 25 years the role of the judiciary in developing and maintaining 
constitutionalism in South Africa has been and continues to be a mainstay 
of the constitutional order. Judicial oversight of all conduct under the law, 
including compliance with the demands of international law relating to 
human rights, is ensured by section 172(1) of the Constitution, which enjoins 
the courts when dealing with constitutional matters to "declare that any law 
or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent 
of its inconsistency" and to then "make any order that is just and equitable". 
A survey of the realities of South African constitutional life and the 
jurisprudence of the courts regarding international law reveals a dissonance 
between the constitutional ideals and governmental practice when it comes 
to parliamentary oversight of the ratification of and withdrawal from treaties. 
Against this background a review of the interplay between the South African 
national executive, Parliament and the judiciary as it is governed by the 
provisions of the Constitution is enlightening. 
3 The realities of South African democracy and its impact 
on international relations 
In terms of the Constitution and considering the extent to which the formal 
democratic requirements have been complied with, South Africa may since 
1994 be described as a functioning multi-party democracy. National, 
provincial and local elections have been held regularly and in accordance 
with the constitutional and legislative schedules and, with the exception of 
a few cases which have required the attention of the judiciary,12 elections 
have been managed well and are widely characterised as having been "free 
and fair". 
Behind the formal constitutional façade, however, South African democracy 
suffers from a few significant flaws and shortcomings. This may to a large 
extent be attributed to the political culture that has developed in recent 
decades, and certain flaws in the constitutional framework that allow political 
exploitation. 
The political culture in the country has been shaped on the one hand by the 
fact that, since 1994, the dominant and therefore governing party (the 
African National Congress (ANC)) has continuously nurtured the attributes 
of a revolutionary liberation movement. On the other hand it has enjoyed an 
unbroken electoral majority in the House of Assembly as well as in most of 
the other elected bodies in the system. The result is that the quality and 
                                            
12  Eg Kham v Electoral Commission 2016 2 SA 338 (CC). 
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course of South African democracy has been made dependent as much on 
the vagaries of the internal policies and processes of a revolutionary 
movement as on the constitutional arrangements of the state. That such is 
the case is demonstrated by the fact that, except for Nelson Mandela, who 
retired at the end of his term of office as president, all other changes in the 
presidency were not brought about by a shift in electoral support of the 
governing party but by the ANC's internal turmoil. 
The weaknesses in the democratic culture of the ANC have been 
exacerbated by some constitutional arrangements regarding the presidency 
and the executive that are prone to abuse by a majority party. At the heart 
of these weaknesses are the arrangements in sections 86 and 87 of the 
Constitution regarding the election of the President and sections 83 to 85 
setting out the powers of the president. In summary, these provisions 
ensure that the leader of the political party that obtained the majority of votes 
in an election of the House of Assembly becomes the president of the 
Republic. Upon election, the newly elected president vacates the top 
parliamentary seat but nonetheless retains firm control over the conduct of 
the rest of the members of the majority party in the House. The President 
becomes not only the head of state, but also the head of government, and 
presides over the cabinet, whose members' ministerial appointment and 
dismissal are within the unchecked power of the President. Under the 
directions of the President, the Cabinet is exclusively in control of policy 
development and implementation through the public service and of the 
preparation and initiation of new legislation and legislative amendments. 
Stripped of the legal niceties, this amounts to an excessively powerful 
presidency whose decisions regarding everything involving the exercise of 
state authority and the functioning of the government are paramount. 
Checks on presidential power do exist, but in practice they are primarily 
party political in nature. Secondary checks are the parameters for 
government conduct laid down in the Constitution, and the availability of 
judicial review.13 
                                            
13  The Constitutional Court has acknowledged this state of affairs and has been 
prepared to defend the broad scope of presidential powers but has recently found 
reason to qualify this stance. In Law Society of South Africa v President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2019 3 BCLR 329 (CC) para 3, handed down on 11 
December 2018, the Court offered the following qualification after referring to its 
previous judgments sympathetic to the extent of the powers: "But this is not to be 
understood as an endorsement of, or a solicitation for a licence to exercise 
presidential or executive powers in an unguided or unbridled way. All presidential or 
executive powers must always be exercised in a way that is consistent with the 
supreme law of the Republic and its scheme, as well as the spirit, purport and objects 
of the Bill of Rights, our domestic legislative and international law obligations. Our 
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Although problems with the system emerged before then,14 the darkest 
implications of the structural shortcomings of South African 
constitutionalism were starkly illuminated during the Zuma presidency 
between 2009 and 2018, the disconcerting details of which slowly began 
coming to light in evidence being presented to various commissions of 
enquiry established in 2018 and early 2019. That the Zuma presidency 
represents "lost years" for South African constitutionalism is attested to inter 
alia by the fact that the causes decided in the majority of the key judgments 
concerning human rights, international law and the country's involvement in 
international institutions arose during that period.  
That the constitutional position of the President and of the parliamentary 
majority of the ANC were being employed to avoid the consequences of 
corruption and what eventually became known as "state capture" did not 
escape the attention of the international community. South Africa acceded 
to the Convention of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in 2007 (becoming an associate in six OECD bodies 
and projects and a participant in fifteen),15 which led the organisation's 
Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions (WGB) to 
publish a report in 2008 on the country's implementation of the 
Convention.16 Reacting to the government's announcement that the 
                                            
President is never at large to exercise power that has not been duly assigned. 
Crucially, public power must always be exercised within constitutional bounds and 
in the best interests of all our people." 
14  See eg Venter 2011 CCR. 
15  According to the OECD website (OECD 2019 http://www.oecd. 
org/southafrica/south-africa-and-oecd.htm): "South Africa has also adhered to 19 
OECD instruments, including most recently the Recommendation of the Council for 
Development Co-operation Actors on Managing the Risk of Corruption (2016). It 
participates in various OECD flagship projects and publications, e.g. the Economic 
Outlook, Education at a Glance, Going for Growth, Green Growth, the Employment 
Outlook, the OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook, Pensions at a Glance, and the 
Science, Technology and Industry Outlook. South Africa is also integrated in almost 
half of all OECD datasets and participates in key horizontal projects, such as the 
OECD Strategy on Development. South Africa has championed several of the 
OECD's regional initiatives with sub-Saharan Africa. For example, as vice co-chair it 
has actively contributed to the work of the NEPAD-OECD Africa Investment Initiative. 
South Africa also participates in the activities of the SADC Regional Investment 
Policy Framework project, in the OECD African Development Bank (AfDB) Initiative 
to Support Business Integrity and Anti-Bribery Efforts in Africa, in the annual 
International Economic Forum on Africa and the African Economic Outlook. It is also 
an Associate in the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project and a key and 
active member of the Inclusive Framework for BEPS Implementation Steering 
Group, feeding its own perspectives into the BEPS process as well as supporting 
the efforts of developing countries to provide input through the African Tax 
Administration Forum (ATAF) Technical Committee." 
16  OECD Working Group on Bribery 2008 http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/51/30/40883135.pdf (hereinafter the "WGB Report 2008"). 
F VENTER  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  9 
Directorate of Special Operations (popularly known as the "Scorpions"), 
which was mandated to investigate and prosecute high level crimes, was to 
be disbanded and replaced with a unit under the control of the executive, 
the WGB recognised the dangers of executive interference with 
prosecutorial authority: 
The Working Group expresses serious concern in regard of this issue, and 
notes that it will monitor this further in the context of future evaluations, to 
ensure that the effective enforcement of the foreign bribery offence is not 
affected by this rearrangement of law enforcement responsibilities.17 
It later emerged that the OECD had good reason to be concerned, because 
the machinations of the Zuma administration to neutralise the Scorpions 
could be directly related to the scourge of state capture. The WGB was 
sensitive to these developments, as is evidenced by the following comment 
in its report of 2014:18 
The lead examiners remain very concerned by the strikingly low level of 
foreign bribery enforcement in South Africa. The lack of proactivity raises 
questions of whether considerations prohibited under Article 5 are influencing 
law enforcement decision making. This, coupled with the domestic context, 
where a number of obstacles have undermined the investigation and 
prosecution of high-profile domestic corruption cases – often involving high 
level public officials – continues to raise questions on whether law 
enforcement is able to do their jobs independently and without interference. 
They further regret that since Phase 2, perceptions persist throughout South 
African society that the NPA's credibility has been jeopardised because of 
political interference. 
More diplomatically, but still unambiguously, the lead examiners "strongly" 
recommended that― 
South Africa take concrete steps to ensure that national economic interests 
and the identities of the natural or legal persons involved do not influence the 
investigation or prosecution of foreign bribery cases, including decisions made 
by the NDPP. 
The relevance of corruption and state capture to the protection of human 
rights is that, especially in an unequal society such as South Africa, the 
negative effect on the dignity of the indigent members of this highly unequal 
society who are accorded constitutional protection of their socio-economic 
rights is evident when the state's financial capacity to provide much needed 
basic services is devastated by the corrupt misappropriation of public funds. 
A crucial element of state capture has been the ANC's established policy of 
                                            
17  WGB Report 2008 para 96. 
18  OECD Working Group on Bribery 2014 http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/SouthAfricaPhase3ReportEN.pdf (hereinafter the "WGB Report 2014") 41-
42. 
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"cadre deployment", indicating the placement of pliable loyalists in strategic 
positions in government and state entities to ensure unhindered unfolding 
of projects, especially to avoid legal consequences for illegal and 
unconstitutional conduct.19 
Concerning the role of Parliament in the developments surrounding the 
undermining of the ability of state institutions to combat corruption 
independently, it must be noted that the ANC was complicit in using its 
majority to adopt defective legislation and avoid effective oversight.20 
The systematic assault on human rights by the Mugabe government in 
Zimbabwe is well-documented.21 South Africa's complicity in the 
undermining of the rule of law and the protection of Zimbabweans' rights 
has mostly taken the form of tacit approval or passive cognisance. When, 
however the Zimbabwean government's conduct met with international 
judicial sanction, the Zuma government did not balk at supporting Mugabe. 
Due to the closure of all avenues to judicial review within Zimbabwe against 
state expropriation of land without compensation, some landowners 
approached the Tribunal established by the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) for relief, which found for the applicants in 2008.22 At 
the Summit of Heads of State (including the South African president) of 
2010 it was decided not to insist on Zimbabwe's compliance with the 
judgment, but to effectively suspend the Tribunal. At the 2012 Summit it was 
resolved that the Tribunal should be reconfigured and that its jurisdiction be 
limited to the resolution of disputes between member states, thereby 
excluding citizens' access to the Tribunal on account of human rights 
violations by a member state. A new protocol for the Tribunal was adopted 
by the Summit of 2014, but to date the Tribunal has not been re-activated, 
the ratification process being expected to take many years.23 
South Africa's history with the International Criminal Court (ICC) aptly 
reveals contradictions in the country's and the governing ANC's attitude 
                                            
19  See eg Jeffery BEE: Helping or Hurting? 84-87, 97-98, 101-103. In view of s 195 of 
the Constitution, which requires inter alia a public administration "governed by the 
democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution" including a "high 
standard of professional ethics", cadre deployment is patently unconstitutional. See 
eg Mlokoti v Amathole District Municipality 2009 6 SA 354 (E) 379-380. 
20  See eg Venter 2015 SALJ. 
21  See eg Howard-Hassmann 2010 Hum Rts Q. 
22  Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd v The Republic of Zimbabwe 2008 SADCT 2 (28 November 
2008). 
23  For an exposition of these proceedings, see eg Law Society of South Africa v 
President of the Republic of South Africa 2019 3 BCLR 329 (CC) paras 8-17. 
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towards constitutionalism and international human rights. South Africa was 
closely involved in the development of the Rome Statute in terms of which 
the ICC was established in 1998. When the President of Sudan, Omar al-
Bashir, against whom the ICC had issued arrest warrants to stand trial for 
war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, visited South Africa in 
2015 to attend a summit of the African Union (AU), South Africa was obliged 
to arrest him to be surrendered to the ICC. The government failed to do so, 
however, despite the issuing of a High Court order to effect the arrest. In 
this, however, South Africa is not alone, Chad, Uganda and Malawi also 
having defied the ICC warrants.24 
The South African government also has a poor track record regarding its 
reporting obligations to the treaty-monitoring bodies of the United Nations. 
Not having received official submissions from the government, the UN 
Human Rights Committee (HRC) in 2016 reviewed South Africa as it does 
states that show a disregard for the international human rights system. A 
whole range of South African non-government organisations did provide the 
HRC with submissions.25  
Another example of the government's laxity in this regard was reflected in 
the HRC's response to the government's report on the ICCPR in 2016, 
where it laconically stated that― 
[t]he Committee welcomes the submission of the initial report of South Africa 
and the information presented therein, and regrets that it is 14 years 
overdue.26 
Another political reality is the government's tendency not to comply with, or 
to circumvent binding judgments of the courts. Thus, for instance in 2008, 
the Constitutional Court stated: 
In more recent years, and in particular the period from 2002 onwards, courts 
have been inundated with situations where court orders have been flouted by 
state functionaries, who, on being handed such court orders, have given very 
flimsy excuses which in the end only point to their dilatoriness. The public 
officials seem not to understand the integral role that they play in our 
constitutional state, as the right of access to courts entails a duty not only on 
                                            
24  See eg Okurut and Among 2018 JLCR. 
25  See Anon 2016 ESR Review 14, which ends as follows: "According to Lukas 
Muntingh of the Dullah Omar Institute, the fact that South Africa is late on reporting 
on all but one of the major human rights treaties gives the impression that the 
government is either unwilling or incapable, or both, of producing the required 
reports." 
26  Human Rights Committee: Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of South 
Africa UN Doc CCPR/C/ZFA/CO/1/Add.1 (2017) para 2. 
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the courts to ensure access but on the state to bring about the enforceability 
of court orders.27 
4 Searching for a balance between judicial deference and 
activism in the context of the separation of powers 
Over the past 25 years the South African judiciary has served as the most 
consistent defender of the fibre of constitutionalism, including its 
implications for complying with the international demands for the protection 
of human rights. As appears from the following brief overview of the 
jurisprudence relating to sections 231-233 of the Constitution, the courts 
have been called upon to attempt to develop a balance between judicial 
deference on the one hand, and on the other interference with the tasks of 
the executive and the legislature regarding their compliance with 
international obligations. 
4.1 The Harksen case (2000) 
Shortly after the inception of constitutionalism in 1994, questions arose 
about issues of the extradition of non-citizens. The Extradition Act 67 of 
1962 survived the constitutional transition, and is still in effect today, albeit 
after being amended a number of times. When Germany, with whom South 
Africa did not have an extradition agreement, requested the extradition in 
1994 of a German citizen residing in South Africa, a spectrum of 
considerations ranging from customary international law, the Vienna 
Convention, presidential conduct, the impact of international law on 
municipal law arose. The person being sought for prosecution in Germany 
succeeded in dragging out the resolution of the matter for six years, ending 
in a judgment of the Constitutional Court in 2000.28 
In the absence of an extradition agreement, the President consented in 
terms of section 3(2) of the Act to Harksen's extradition in 1995. Harksen 
attacked the validity of the presidential consent in various suits, essentially 
on the argument that in terms of the common law a presidential consent to 
                                            
27  Nyathi v MEC for Health, Gauteng 2008 5 SA 94 (CC) para 60. These sentiments 
have been confirmed various times, more recently in eg Economic Freedom Fighters 
v Speaker, National Assembly 2016 3 SA 580 (CC) para 1. 
28  Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 825 (CC). As a matter 
of interest, the extradition application was granted by State President de Klerk prior 
to the coming into operation of the 1993 Constitution, and was again granted by 
President Mandela in 1995 prior to the coming into operation of the 1996 
Constitution, but the presidential granting of the application was attacked for being 
unconstitutional first under the 1993 Constitution and later under the 1996 
Constitution. 
F VENTER  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  13 
extradition amounted to an international agreement between the states 
concerned. He also argued that section 231 of the Constitution was a 
codification of a common law rule, and that the Presidents' decision(s) to 
surrender Harksen did not comply with the requirement that international 
agreements must be incorporated into municipal law by parliamentary 
legislation.  
The Constitutional Court rejected the argument, finding that the presidential 
consent was a domestic act. For the present purposes the following dictum 
of the judgment is noteworthy for the Court's acknowledgement of its role 
relative to the other role players:29 
Although the judicial determination of the existence of an international 
agreement may require the consideration of a number of complex issues, the 
decisive factor is said to be whether 'the instrument is intended to create 
international legal rights and obligations between the parties'. 
4.2 The Glenister case (2011)  
As part of a protracted forensic battle concerning the disbandment, in terms 
of parliamentary legislation adopted in 2008, of the corruption-fighting 
Directorate of Special Operations ("the Scorpions"), the Constitutional Court 
thoroughly considered section 231 of the Constitution.30 Significantly, the 
Court stated that31 
[the] constitutional scheme of section 231 is deeply rooted in the separation 
of powers, in particular the checks and balances between the executive and 
the legislature.  
It was found that the UN Convention against Corruption did not create 
binding constitutional rights and obligations,32 but that the state could, also 
in terms of the SADC Corruption Protocol and in accordance with the reports 
of the OECD, be held responsible for preventing and combating corruption 
effectively in terms of its obligations in international law.33 This, the majority 
                                            
29  Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 825 (CC) para 21, 
quoting Jennings and Watts Oppenheim's International Law 1202. 
30  This was induced by the signing and ratification of the UN Convention against 
Corruption of 2004 (although the Court was unable to determine whether the 
required resolution of Parliament had been passed): Glenister v President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) (hereinafter Glenister), fn 64. The Court 
was split 5 to 4 in its findings, but there was largely consensus among the justices 
regarding the points of interest here. 
31  Glenister para 89. This was a dictum in the minority judgment, but it also reflects the 
approach taken by the majority. 
32  Glenister para 103. 
33  Glenister paras 178, 181, 187-189. 
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stated, was not to incorporate international instruments judicially, "through 
the back door" as it were, but simply being "faithful to the Constitution 
itself".34 The Court emphasised that35 
… the very structure of our Constitution – in which the rule of law is a founding 
value, which distributes power by separating it between the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary, and which creates various institutions supporting 
constitutional democracy, which it expressly decrees must be independent 
and impartial – affords the obligation [to create an independent corruption-
fighting entity] a homely and emphatic welcome. 
The outcome of this case was that parts of the impugned legislation were 
declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution, but Parliament was given 
eighteen months to remedy the defects.36 
4.3 The al-Bashir case (2015)  
In dealing with the al-Bashir incident, the Gauteng High Court vigorously 
and explicitly justified its order and subsequent censuring of the executive 
for not complying with the order. The Court made it clear that the 
government's duty to arrest a head of state against whom an ICC warrant 
for arrest was current could not lawfully be neutralised by the mere adoption 
of resolutions of cabinet and the issuing of ministerial notices as the 
government attempted to do in contravention of the Constitution. The Court 
also expressed its displeasure with the executive for obviously facilitating 
al-Bashir's clandestine departure from the country before the ordered arrest 
could take place.37 The Court made its dissatisfaction with the government's 
delinquency quite clear, while also acknowledging its own constitutional 
limitations:38 
Having regard to the principle of separation of powers between the executive, 
legislative and judicial arms of the state, it is in any event clear that this court 
would not have concerned itself with policy decisions which in their nature fall 
outside its ambit. As a court we are concerned with the integrity of the rule of 
law and the administration of justice. 
                                            
34  Glenister paras 195, 201 and 202. 
35  Glenister para 205. 
36  To date these defects have been attended to only grudgingly and, in the end, 
unsatisfactorily. See eg Venter 2015 SALJ. 
37  Southern African Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development 2015 5 SA 1 (GP) (hereinafter Southern African Litigation Centre) 
paras 36 and 37. 
38  Southern African Litigation Centre para 30. 
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The Court lucidly stated the constitutional foundation for its findings:39 
[A] democratic state based on the rule of law cannot exist or function, if the 
government ignores its constitutional obligations and fails to abide by court 
orders. A court is the guardian of justice, the cornerstone of a democratic 
system based on the rule of law. If the state, an organ of state or state official 
does not abide by court orders, the democratic edifice will crumble stone by 
stone until it collapses and chaos ensues. 
4.4 The ICC case (2017)  
In 2016 the South African government issued a notice of withdrawal from 
the Rome Statute. The validity of the notice was successfully attacked in 
proceedings before the Gauteng High Court due to non-compliance with 
section 231 of the Constitution, which required the approval of Parliament 
to validate the withdrawal. The operation of the principle of separation of 
powers ("clearly delineated in section 231") was once more emphasised in 
the judgment of February 2017:40 
Constitutionally, an important constitutional principle of the doctrine of 
separation of powers is implicated. Because the national executive had 
purported to exercise power it constitutionally does not have, its conduct is 
invalid and has no effect in law. Whatever Parliament does about the 
subsequent request to it by the national executive to approve the notice of 
withdrawal would not cure its invalidity. 
The Court anticipated that the government would eventually introduce such 
legislation, and made it clear that, if the Constitution were complied with, the 
adoption of the required legislation would be in order, concluding that, "in 
deference to Parliament, no more should be said on this aspect".41 
In July 2017 the ICC ruled that South Africa had failed to comply with its 
obligations under the Rome Statute by not arresting al-Bashir, but that 
referral of the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or the Security 
                                            
39  Southern African Litigation Centre para 37.2. In para 38 the Court cited jurisprudence 
of the Constitutional Court, concluding with the statement that where the rule of law 
is undermined, "the court must fearlessly address this through its judgments, and not 
hesitate to keep the executive within the law, failing which it would not have complied 
with its constitutional obligations to administer justice to all persons alike without fear, 
favour or prejudice". 
40  Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation 2017 3 SA 
212 (GP) para 59. 
41  Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation 2017 3 SA 
212 (GP) para 63. 
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Council was not warranted as a means of enforcing South Africa's 
cooperation.42  
The government maintained its intention to withdraw from the ICC and 
introduced a Bill before Parliament towards the end of 201743 in terms of 
which, if adopted, the 2002 legislation that implemented the Rome Statute 
would be repealed. The Preamble of the Bill states that Parliament is mindful 
of the seriousness of international crimes, but that it is "also mindful that": 
 the Republic of South Africa is a founder member of the African Union; 
 the Republic of South Africa plays an important role in resolving 
conflicts on the African continent and encourages the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts wherever they occur; 
 the Republic of South Africa, in exercising its international relations 
with heads of state of foreign countries, particularly heads of state of 
foreign countries in which serious conflicts occur or have occurred, is 
hindered by the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Act, 2002, which together with the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court compel South Africa to arrest 
heads of state of foreign countries wanted by the International Criminal 
Court for the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes and to surrender such persons to the International Criminal 
Court, even under circumstances where the Republic of South Africa 
is actively involved in promoting peace, stability and dialogue in those 
countries; and 
 the Republic of South Africa wishes to give effect to the rule of 
customary international law which recognises the diplomatic immunity 
of heads of state in order to effectively promote dialogue and the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts wherever they may occur, but 
particularly on the African continent. 
At the time of writing, this Bill was still before Parliament.  
4.5 The NERSA case (2017)  
Since 1994 the conduct of South Africa's foreign relations has, in line with 
ANC policy, steadily gravitated away from the West towards socialist 
alliances (such as BRICS, which South Africa joined in 2010). Illustrative of 
this trend, and of the mismanagement of the energy needs of the country, 
was a judgment of the Western Cape Division of the High Court in 2017,44 
which put paid to an attempt by the government to enter into an international 
                                            
42  Situation in Darfur, Sudan; In the Case of the Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-
Bashir (Pre-Trial Chamber II) ICC-02/05-01/09 (6 July 2017). 
43  The International Crimes Bill [B37-2017]. 
44  Earthlife Africa v Minister of Energy 2017 5 SA 227 (WCC) (hereinafter Earthlife 
Africa). 
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agreement with Russia that would have had disastrous economic 
consequences for the country. 
After 1995 South Africa had concluded intergovernmental agreements 
(IGAs) relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with various 
countries, including (in 2014) with the Russian Federation. The latter 
agreement was linked to a determination of the requirements of the country 
for the generation of energy using nuclear power, involving the National 
Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) and first the Department of 
Energy, and later ESKOM. The IGA was steeped in controversy, inter alia 
due to strong suggestions of underlying corruption and the dismissal by 
President Zuma of the Minister of Finance (Nhlanhla Nene) for refusing to 
support the agreement. 
The Minister of Energy tabled the IGA with Russia (together with IGA's with 
the USA and Korea) in Parliament under section 231(3) of the Constitution, 
creating the false impression that it did not need parliamentary approval. 
Environmental NGOs then approached the Court, which determined that the 
tabling of the Russian IGA "was specific, often peremptory, of wide scope, 
and material consequence", did not merely deal with nuclear cooperation, 
but had the character of a binding agreement concerning the procurement 
of nuclear plants, requiring parliamentary approval to become binding. The 
Court found that45  
should an international agreement be tabled incorrectly under s 231(3) rather 
than s 231(2) the review of any such decision can be seen as upholding rather 
than undermining the separation of powers, 
and the Russian IGA warranted the focussed attention of Parliament to46  
give optimal effect to the fundamental constitutional principles of the 
separation of powers, open and accountable government, and participatory 
democracy.  
The Court also found it necessary to decline expressly to adjudicate on the 
constitutional merits or shortcomings of the terms of the IGA regarding 
compliance with procurement procedures before the appropriate 
parliamentary processes and possible public consultation took place, 
considering "that the principle of separation of powers calls for the court to 
exercise judicial restraint" in this regard.47 
                                            
45  Earthlife Africa para 103. 
46  Earthlife Africa para 114. 
47  Earthlife Africa para 121. 
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4.6 Grace Mugabe (2018)  
Following charges of assault laid in 2017 in Johannesburg against (now 
former) President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe's wife, Grace Mugabe, and 
her subsequent swift departure from the country, the South African Minister 
of International Relations and Co-operation conferred diplomatic immunity 
from criminal prosecution on her, thereby terminating the criminal 
investigation. When this was challenged judicially, the Gauteng High Court 
thoroughly considered the applicable customary international law, foreign 
judgments and the relevant South African legislation, and found in its 
judgment of July 2018 that not even the Zimbabwean President enjoyed 
immunity in proceedings relating to the death or injury of any person, and 
even less could his wife be granted "derivative immunity" as the Minister 
had attempted to do.  
The Court set the Minister's decision aside as unlawful and unconstitutional, 
stating that the granting of immunity to a person not falling within one of the 
relevant categories "will not withstand the test of legality, rationality or 
reasonableness. That is our law".48 
5 Addressing the gaps and the obstacles 
An objective assessment of the judgments reviewed above shows that the 
South African judiciary has performed a sterling job in preventing the 
executive, and the executive-dominated legislature, from managing 
international relations, as it tends to do, in a cavalier manner. The courts 
have thereby been instrumental in curbing untrammelled executive 
disregard for human rights and international obligations. Judges are not in 
a position, however, to enforce consistent rationality, constitutionality and 
legality in the conduct of the public service, the executive and Parliament – 
they can merely correct misconduct ex post and provide grounds for 
successful legal attacks on future transgressions. 
In their search for an appropriate balance between activism and deference, 
the courts have employed the appropriate, if not always clearly defined 
constitutional concepts and constructs: the rule of law, legality, democratic 
constitutionalism, and the separation of powers, all with appropriate judicial 
deference for the constitutionally allotted functional areas of the other 
branches. This the judiciary has been called upon to do amidst a political 
atmosphere and culture cultivated by a democratic majority, prepared – and 
                                            
48  Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations and Co-operation 2018 6 
SA 109 (GP) para 30. 
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apparently unconcerned with the long-term consequences thereof – to 
exploit a constitutional weakness which concentrates an inordinate amount 
of power in the hands of its leader. 
From the cases discussed above it would appear to be part of the 
government's strategy in the unfolding of its policies regarding international 
relations and the protection of fundamental rights to exploit the unavoidable 
lag between executive malpractice and judicial censure. This represents a 
worrying demonstration of governmental cynicism towards 
constitutionalism. 
Addressing this problematic situation has largely depended on initiatives 
taken by civil society (NGO's, opposition political parties AND the media) 
using various means, including litigation. Beyond such actions, the 
democratic process, which has at least formally been preserved to date, is 
the most important means by which the trend of governmental impunity may 
be countered. It seems to be unlikely that a political majority which is 
insensitive to public, judicial and international censure for delinquency 
would of its own accord heal itself.  
An executive approach of "shoot first and ask questions later" in matters of 
international relations is not an issue that would normally attract much of the 
attention of an electorate largely composed of citizens primarily concerned 
with the severe difficulties of day-to-day economic and social survival, 
however. In addition to continued public pressure and judicial correction, the 
future of sound and constitutional international relations and the protection 
of fundamental rights therefore largely depends on a fundamental moral 
reformation of the parliamentary majority, however unlikely this may be. This 
reality will therefore likely continue to place an immense responsibility on 
the judicial branch, in the hope that naming and shaming may eventually 
induce transformation towards respect for constitutionalism. 
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